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DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILDREN:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMES COMMITTED WHILE
UNDER AGE EIGHTEEN
VICTOR L. STREIB*
Within the seamless web of the law and the empirical reality of capital
punishment, what role does the youth of the offender play? If it is
assumed that "children have a very special place in life which law should
reflect,"' does it necessarily follow that "civilized societies will not
tolerate the spectacle of execution of children?"'
Fueled by eight recent executions3 and by the presence of more than
twelve hundred persons on death row awaiting execution," the debate
about capital punishment continues with renewed vigor. The debate
embraces such issues as the historical evolution of capital punishment,
the legal process involved, the characteristics of the executed offenders,
the nature of their offenses, and the criminological purposes served
by "a punishment.., unique in its severity and irrevocability." 5 This
article examines these issues as applied to very young offenders lawfully
executed in the United States for crimes they committed while under
age eighteen.
In the early 1980s, capital punishment of children is reemerging as
an issue of great national importance,6 sufficient even to capture the
© 1983 Victor L. Streib
*Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law, Cleveland State University Visiting Professor of Law, 1983-84, San Diego. The author
wishes to acknowledge and express appreciation for the funding support of the Cleveland-Marshall
Fund, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.-Ed.
1. In re Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary at 133 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980).
3. Gary Gilmore, Utah, Jan. 17, 1977; John Spenkelink, Florida, May 25, 1979; Jesse Bishop,
Nevada, Oct. 22, 1979; Steven Judy, Indiana, Mar. 9, 1981; Frank Coppola, Virginia, Aug.
10, 1982; Charles Brooks, Jr., Texas, Dec. 7, 1982; John Louis Evans III, Alabama, Apr. 22,
1983; and Jimmy Lee Gray, Mississippi, Sept. 2, 1983.
4. As of Aug. 20, 1983, 1,230 persons were on death row awaiting execution. NAACP LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (Aug. 20, 1983).
5. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion).
6. For the purpose of this article, the term "children" means all persons under the age
of eighteen. Capital punishment of children refers to sentencing to death or executing a person
for a crime committed by that person at an age of less than eighteen years. It is beyond the
scope of this article to explore the various ages at which persons are considered children or adults
for purposes of voting, driving, contracting, working, etc. For particularly insightful analysis
of some of these issues, see F. ZIMRINO, THm CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982);
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attention of the United States Supreme Court and the American Bar
Association.7 The reappearance of capital punishment for crimes com-
mitted by persons under age eighteen is primarily the product of two
trends. One trend is an increasing willingness to subject persons under
the maximum juvenile court jurisdictional age limit to criminal pros-
ecution, either through direct prosecution of the child in criminal court8
or through initial juvenile court jurisdiction being transferred in waiver
proceedings to criminal court.' The other trend is the return to reliance
upon capital punishment in the criminal justice system.10 The combined
effect of these trends is an increased exposure of children to the possibil-
ity of capital punishment for their misdeeds.
Historical Background of Capital Punishment for Children
The United States inherited the bulk of its criminal law, including
the tradition of capital punishment, primarily from England but also
from other European countries. A fundamental premise of this criminal
jurispiudence was then and is now that persons under age seven were
conclusively presumed to be incapable of entertaining criminal intent
and thus could not have criminal liability imposed upon them.'I For
persons from age seven to age fourteen, the presumption of inability
to entertain criminal intent was rebuttable, and if rebutted, such a person
could be convicted of a crime and be sentenced to death.2 No such
presumption applied to persons age fourteen or over. This view of
children's liability in the criminal justice system was accepted by the
United States Supreme Court in In re Gault'3: "At common law,
Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363 (1982). Eighteen is chosen as
the crucial age in this analysis because a large majority of jurisdictions use that age as the cutoff
for juvenile court jurisdiction.
7. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). At its Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Ga.,
in August, 1983, the American Bar Association adopted the following resolution: "Be it resolved
that the American Bar Association opposes, in principle, the imposition of capital punish-
ment upon any person for any offense committed while under the age of eighteen (18)." Juvenile
Justice Letter No. 9 from Alaire Bretz Rieffel, Section of Criminal Justice, ABA, to Members
of the Juvenile Justice Committee of the Criminal Justice Section, ABA (Aug. 11, 1983).
8. See, e.g., N.J. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a)(ii), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A (West Supp. 1981);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10.00 (18), 30.00 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 180.75,
190.71, 210.43, 220.10(5)(g) (McKinney 1982).
9. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
10. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that capital punishment statutes are not
inherently unconstitutional). Since Gregg, more than two-thirds of the states have adopted new
capital punishment statutes. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1980, at 3 (1981).
11. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 23-24 (1792); 1 M. HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 25-28 (1682).
12. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 23-24; 1 HALE, supra note 11, at 25-28.
13. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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children under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal
intent. Beyond that age, they were subjected to arrest, trial, and in
theory to punishment like adult offenders."'"
Considerable debate has centered on the issue of whether children
were actually executed after being sentenced to death. Much of the
debate seems to be confused by the use of relatively vague terms such
as "children" and "adolescents," and by infrequent reporting of the
age of the offender on the date of the crime or the execution. The
term "adolescent" has rarely been used in a legal sense even though
it is a regular part of the vocabulary of the social sciences.'" Despite
this confusing "linguistic discontinuity,"'6 the conventional historical
view is that in England "[a]dolescents as well as children could be-
and actually were-sentenced to death and even executed."'7
As for the younger members of this group, the English law's bark
was apparently much worse than its bite. Knell studied the official
records for the years 1801 to 1836 for the Old Bailey,'8 a major criminal
court in London. In 103 cases, children under age fourteen were
sentenced to death but none were ever executed.
The same dichotomy between sentencing and execution carried over
to colonial America and the early United States. In the early nineteenth
century, "courts were extremely hesitant to sentence a child under
fourteen to death."'9 As for actually carrying out the death sentence,
Platt and Diamond0 found: "[O]nly two children under fourteen were
judicially executed between the years 1806 and 1882. In both cases,
the defendants were Negro slaves and, in one case, the victim was the
son of a white property owner."2 ' At least some trial courts were
convinced that the reluctance to execute younger children was univer-
sal. A criminal trial judge observed in 1823: "The lowest period, that
judgment of death has been inflicted upon an infant in the United
States, has never extended below sixteen years, or at least after a careful
14. Id. at 16.
15. ZIMRING, supra note 6, at xi-xiii.
16. Id. at xii.
17. 1 L. RADzINOWIcz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM
1750: THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM 1750-1853 11 (1948).
18. Knell, Capital Punishment: Its Adminstration in Relation to Juvenile Offenders in the
Nineteenth Century and Its Possible Adminstration in the Eighteenth, 5 BRrr. J. CRIMINOLOGY
198, 199 (1965).
19. Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility
and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1227, 1246 (1966). See also A. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 211-12
(2d ed. 1977).
20. Platt & Diamond, supra note 19.
21. Id. at 1246-47 (referring to Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858), and State v. Guild,
10 N.J.L. 163 (1828)).
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search none could be found, and it is presumed none can be found."22
Courts that sentenced younger offenders to death apparently believed
that commutation of their sentences was likely.23
Recent research suggests that these scholars and courts were seriously
misinformed. ' Seven children were executed prior to 1800 and 95 prior
to 1900, the youngest aged ten years. It is likely that courts today are
no better informed.
Impact of the Juvenile Justice System, 1899 to 1930
During this period in the United States, the juvenile justice system
began to emerge.2" The United States Supreme Court provided the
conventional explanation:
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and
penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison
sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. . . . The
apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness which they observed
in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to
be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be
abandoned. The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated"
and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.2
6
Mid-nineteenth-century reformers focused primarily upon modifying
the harshness of the correctional phase of the criminal justice system.7
The best-known reforms were the houses of refuge established in various
cities by reformers anxious to separate youthful offenders from adult
criminals." The success of these reforms was limited by the continuing
criminal court jurisdiction over those youthful offenders. This led
reformers to believe that a separate legal system for juveniles was needed.
Following Illinois' lead in 1899, a number of states enacted juvenile
court legislation patterned on the statutes of Illinois and other pioneer
states. By 1925 almost all states had such legislation;9 the federal govern-
22. People v. Teller, I WHEELER CRIMINAL LAW CASES 231, 233 (N.Y. City Ct. 1823).
23. W. SMirrIERs, ExEcuTV-E CLEMENCY IN PENNSYLVANIA (1909); Wolfgang, Kelly & Nolde,
Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 301 (1962).
24. See infra note 45 and Table 9.
25. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
26. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
27. S. DAVIS, RIoirrs OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 1981).
28. Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of
Juvenile Delinquents, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 68 (1972). Some commentators suggest that
the reformers were in fact motivated by a desire to gain greater control over children through
punitive policies disguised as rehabilitation. PLATT, supra note 19; Fox, supra note 25, at 1188-89.
29. V. STREIB, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 5-7 (1978).
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss3/4
DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILDREN
ment joined the trend in 1938.30 The appearance of the juvenile justice
system can be seen as a codification of the previous unofficial and
implicit policy of giving special treatment to young offenders.3' For
the purpose of this article, the premise is accepted that a juvenile justice
system should not punish the juvenile offender but must treat and
rehabilitate him.2 Adoption of this premise requires rejection of the
death penalty for juvenile offenders. During the early era of juvenile
justice (1900-1930), however, seventy-seven persons were executed for
crimes committed while under age eighteen.3 None were sentenced to
death directly by juvenile courts but were condemned by adult criminal
courts.
Prosecution of Children in Criminal Court
In most jurisdictions today, delinquent acts are defined as acts in
violation of state or federal law, local ordinance, or an order of the
juvenile court.31 Generally, this definition encompasses acts that would
be crimes if committed by an adult. This broad category includes murder
and other capital crimes unless they are specifically excluded from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The essentially criminal nature of
these delinquent acts means that the cases could fall within the jurisdic-
tion of criminal court, as has been recognized by the Supreme Court
in Gault:
[T]he fact of the matter is that there is little or no assurance...
that a juvenile apprehended and interrogated by the police or even
by the Juvenile Court itself will remain outside of the reach of
adult courts as a consequence of the offense for which he has been
taken into custody. In Arizona, as in other States, provision is made
for Juvenile Courts to relinquish or waive jurisdiction to the ordi-
nary criminal courts.3
In 1975 the Supreme Court noted in passing that "an overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions permits transfer in certain instances. "36
The Supreme Court's first direct consideration of juvenile justice
30. Rupert, Juvenile Criminal Proceedings in Federal Courts, 18 Loy. L. RaV. 133, 139
(1971-72).
31. STREIB, supra note 29, at 5-13.
32. This premise was uniformly incorporated into juvenile statutes and was explicitly recognized
by the Supreme Court: "The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child
was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through institu-
tionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
.33. See infra note 45 and Table 9.
34. DAVIS, supra note 27, at 2-12.
35. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1967).
36. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535 (1975).
1983]
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issues, in Kent v. United States in 1966,1" was a review of the pro-
cedures by which a juvenile court could and should waive jurisdiction
over a juvenile offender in order to transfer the case to adult criminal
court. The significance of such transfer is apparent from the facts in
Kent: 16-year-old Morris A. Kent, Jr., was transferred from juvenile
to criminal court, convicted of six felonies, and sentenced to a total
of thirty to ninety years in prison.38 For many jurisdictions, the transfer
from juvenile to criminal court can trigger the possibility of the death
penalty. 9
A person under the age limit for juvenile court jurisdiction will never-
theless be tried in criminal court if the offense charged has been expressly
excluded from the jurisdiction of juvenile court."0 Typically, only the
most serious crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery are excluded.
Some states expressly exclude capital offenses from juvenile court
jurisdiction," leaving only criminal court jurisdiction over such offenses.
Finally, some states give the prosecuting attorney discretion to decide
in which court the case should be filed. 2 If the prosecutor files a juvenile
petition, the case proceeds in juvenile court; if a criminal information
is filed or a grand jury indictment is obtained, the case proceeds in
criminal court.
Each of these three alternatives lodges the choice of court in a
different primary decision-maker. The traditional court waiver alter-
native leaves the decision up to the judiciary-specifically the juvenile
court judge. In the second alternative, the legislature has made the
original and preemptive decision to place certain cases exclusively in
criminal court. The prosecutor is the decision-maker as to the choice
of court in the third alternative. Whichever means is followed, an
offender under the juvenile court age limit is subjected to the full
authority of the criminal court, typically including the power to impose
capital punishment for certain crimes.
Characteristics of Executed Children
Of the 14,029 known legal executions in American history,43 287 of
37. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
38. Id. at 550.
39. ZIMRING, supra note 6, at xii:
In some jurisdictions, the question of whether a 16-year-old accused of murder
will stay in juvenile court, or be tried in the criminal courts for a capital crime,
will depend on an individual judge assessing whether that 16-year-old is "mature"
and "sophisticated." If he is found to be "sophisticated," his reward can be eligibility
for the electric chair.
40. DAVIS, supra note 27, at 2-15 to 2-17.
41. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (Repl. 1981).
42. DAVIs, supra note 27, at 2-17 to 2-19.
43. The figure 14,029 was provided by Watt Espy, Capital Punishment Research Project,
[Vol. 36:613
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them have been for crimes committed by persons under the age of
eighteen.4 Ninety-five of these executions occurred prior to the ad-
vent of the juvenile justice system (pre-1900) and 192 occurred after
1900. The first such execution was in 1642 in Massachusetts; the most
recent was in 1964 in Texas.5
Table 1 indicates the age of these executed children at the time of
the offense as accurately as can be determined from the available
information. The youngest Were age ten at the time of the offense,
with a total of thirty-nine children executed for committing crimes while
age fifteen or younger. The two 10-year-olds were an unnamed black
Table I
Pre-1900 and Post-1900 Executions
for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen
According to Age When Crime Committed
Age When 1642 1900
Crime to to
Committed 1899 Present Totals
Unknown 4(4070) 1(1%) 5(2070)
10 2(2%) 0(0070) 2(1%)
11 1(107) 0(0070) 1(0%)
12 4(4%) 0(0%) 4(107o)
13 4(4%) 1(1%7o) 5(270)
14 3(3%) 2(107o) 5(2%)
15 8(8%) 9(5%) 17(6%)
16 22(23%) 30(16o) 52(18%)
17 47(4907o) 149(78%) 196(68%)
Totals: 95(100070) 192(10070) 287(100%70)
University of Alabama School of Law. Letter with data from Watt Espy to Victor Streib (Apr.
28, 1983). Espy has verified these 14,029 executions through newspaper reports, official documents,
and other sources over his many years of research on this project.
44. Id. The 14,029 case files were examined to identify the 287 cases discussed in this article.
The other primary source of data was Teeters & Zibulka, Executions Under State Authority-An
Inventory, in W. BOWERS, ExEcUTIONs IN AMERICA 200 (1974). For some of the older cases,
the information is fairly sketchy; however, this is clearly the most complete and accurate data
on capital punishment for young offenders available.
45. The data presented in this section are the most up-to-date and accurate available from
this ongoing research. These data and their analyses supersede previously presented papers from
earlier stages of this research, including: Streib & L. Sametz, "Killing Kids for Justice: Capital
Punishment for Young Offenders" (Nov. 1982) (Annual Meeting of the American Society of
Criminology, Toronto, Ontario, Canada); Streib, "Capital Punishment for Juveniles in the Criminal
Justice System" (June 1982) (Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada); Streib, "Death Penalty for Children: State Execution for Crimes Committed
While Under Age Eighteen" (Mar. 1982) (Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice
Sciences; Louisville, Kentucky) (all available from the author).
1983]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
child, hanged at Alexandria, Louisiana, in September of 1855,' 6 and
James Arcene, a Cherokee Indian child hanged at Fort Smith, Arkansas,
on June 26, 1885.1" Since 1900, the youngest has been 13-year-old
Fortune Ferguson, Jr., electrocuted at the Florida State Prison on April
27, 1927.48 The unmistakable conclusion to be drawn from these data
is that, in more recent times, capital punishment has been almost
exclusively reserved for older children; approximately two-thirds (22/35)
of the executions of those age fifteen or younger occurred prior to
1900. Since 1900, 93% of child executions were for crimes committed
by persons aged sixteen or seventeen.
The race of the offender has long been a glaring issue in capital
punishment.9 Race also seems to be an important factor in the execution
of children. Table 2 indicates the race of the 287 executed children.
Not surprisingly, about two-thirds of the children executed during this
340-year period were black. This would seem not to be just a century-
old history of casually executing slaves. The overrepresentation of black
children in this population of executed children has increased
Table 2
Pre-1900 and Post-1900 Executions
for Crimes Committed While Under Age 18 According
to Race of the Executed Offender
Race of 1642 1900
Executed to to
Offender 1899 Present Totals
American Indian 9(9%) 1(1%) 10(3%)
Chinese 0(0%) 3(2%) 3(1%)
Hispanic 2(2%) 5(3%) 7(2%)
Black 44(46%) 135(70%) 179(62%)
White* 25(26%) 34(18%) 59(21%)
Unknown 15(16%) 14(7%) 29(10%)
Totals 95(100%) 192(100%) 287(100%)
*Some persons categorized as white, particularly in early recordkeeping, may
actually have been Hispanic.
46. QUINBY, THE GALLOWS, THE PRISON AND THE POOR HOUSE 49-50 (1856) (located in library
of Watt Espy, Capital Punishment Research Project, University of Alabama).
47. G. SHIRLEY, LAW WEsr OF FORT SmH 218 (1968); Galveston Daily News, June 27, 1885.
48. See generally Ferguson v. State, 90 Fla. 105, 105 So. 840 (1925), cerl. dismissed, 273
U.S. 663 (1927) (no federal question presented).
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dramatically since 1900. Nor has the racial factor disappeared recently;
79% (33/42) of the children executed since 1945 were black.
The treatment of black children should be compared to that of female
children. Of these 287 children executed, seven were female, all black
or Indian. The last female child executed was 17-year-old Caroline
Shipp, hanged near Dallas, North Carolina, on January 22, 1892, for
the murder of her infant son."
Capital punishment is imposed only for capital crime, but this category
of crime has changed frequently over the past three centuries. Table
3 presents the data on the kinds of capital crimes committed by executed
children. The overwhelming majority of executions (80%) were for
murder. Thirty-one executions were for rape and eleven were for
attempted rape; all forty-two of these children were black. The last
child execution occurred in Texas in 1964 for the crime of rape."




Pre-1900 and Post-1900 Executions




Offense 1899 Present Totals
Unknown 1(1%) 5(3%) 6(2%)
Sodomy/Animals 2(2%) 0(0%) 2(1%)
Arson 3(3%) 0(0%) 3(1%)
Spy 1(1%) 0(0%) 1(0%)
Robbery 1(1%) 3(2%) 4(1%)
Assault 2(2%) 9(5%) 11(4%)
Rape 4(4%) 27(14%) 31(11%)
Murder 81(84%) 148(77%) 229(80%)
Totals 95(100%) 192(100%) 287(100%)
50. Williams & Dover, The Last Woman to be Hanged, in THE STATE, Feb. 1980, at 25;
Louisville Courier-Journal, Jan. 23, 1892.
51. See generally Echols v. State, 370 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (affirming convic-
tion and death sentence for James Andrew Echols, executed May 7, 1964); Houston Post, May
7, 1964.
52. N. TETTERS & J. HEDBLOM .... HANG BY TE NECK: Tm LEGAL USE OF SCAFFOLD AND
NOOSE, GIBBET, STAKE AND FuoNG SQUAD FROM COLONIAL Tams TO TEm PRESENT 111 (1967).
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Executions of children have been much more common in some regions
of the United States than in others," as is illustrated by Table 4. The
South region has accounted for 62% of the total (178/287), with the
South-Atlantic division of that region providing about two-thirds of
those 178. The other three regions have executed from 8% to 16%,
respectively, of the total nationwide.
(text continued on p. 624)
53. The four regions and nine divisions used as the basis for these analyses are those established
by the United States Bureau of the Census.
[Vol. 36:613
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Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 provide the state-by-state breakdown of these
287 executions. Within the Northeast region, New York accounts for
one-half of the total (22/45) for this nine-state region. In the six New
England states, only thirteen children have been executed. Certain states
have also provided the bulk of the cases for the North-Central region.
For example, Ohio is responsible for 79% (19/24) of the executions
of children within the five-state East North-Central division. Missouri's
total of seven is 64% of the eleven within the seven-state West North-
Central division. Table 7 reveals the same pattern, with Arizona and
California far outpacing their sister states within the two divisions of
the West region.
(text continued on p. 630)
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This pattern of single-state dominance of the divisions is not as strong
for the South region. Although Georgia leads the South region (as well
as all jurisdictions nationwide) with forty executions, it accounts for
only 36% of the total for the nine-state South-Atlantic division. This
is because other states also have executed many children, such as nine-
teen in Virginia, eighteen in North Carolina, and twelve in Florida.
Within the four-state East South-Central division, the leaders are
Tennessee with thirteen and Alabama with twelve. Texas with seventeen
leads the four-state West South-Central division.
The regional theme is important within the categories of the race
of the offender and the crime involved. Nationwide, 62% of the children
executed have been black; outside of the South region, 24% have been
black. Within the seventeen-state South region, 86% have been black;
within the South region's South-Atlantic division (nine states), 93%
have been black. For four of these states, 100% of the children executed
have been black.1
4
The South region has been more willing than other regions to impose
capital punishment for crimes other than murder. Nationwide, 80%
of the executions have been for the crime of murder. Within the South
region, the figure is 72%; outside, 92%. One striking example is that
all forty-two of the child executions for rape or attempted rape have
occurred in the South region.
Table 9 presents these data broken down by the decade in which
Table 9
Executions For Crimes Committed While
Under Age 18 By Time Period
Time Period Executions Time Period Executions
1642-1699 2 1900-1909 23
1700-1799 5 1910-1919 26
1800-1809 0 1920-1929 28
1810-1819 1 1930-1939 44
1820-1829 2 1940-1949 50
1830-1839 3 1950-1959 17
1840-1849 4 1960-1969 4
1850-1859 7 1970-1979 0




1642-1899 95 1900-present 192
54. Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia.
630 [Vol. 36:613
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the execution occurred. The peak periods for executions of children
were the 1930s and 1940s. Almost half of all of the post-1900 executions
took place during those twenty years.
For a variety of reasons, all executions ceased in the 1960s and did
not begin again until 1977. No children have been executed since 1964,
but approximately twenty persons have been sentenced to death and
await execution for crimes committed while under age eighteen. Included
are Todd Ice of Kentucky, who was only fifteen years old at the time
his crime was committed, and Tina Canadea of Mississippi, who was
only sixteen at the time of her crime.
Recent Legal Developments in Capital Punishment of Children
More than three-fourths of the nations of the world (73 of 93
reporting countries) have set age eighteen as the minimum age for
execution." The United Nations endorsed this position in 1976.36
Another indication of the present global attitude is the recent
condemnation of the death penalty by Pope John Paul 11.7 Contrast
this benevolent international attitude with the current "get tougw'
attitude toward violent juvenile offenders that seems to be sweeping
legislatures and the judiciary in the United States." As for public
acceptance of the death penalty as an appropriate legal reaction to
serious crime, polls in the United States indicate that about two-thirds
of those questioned favor the death penalty. 9
The primary constitutional barrier to imposition of the death penalty
has been the eighth amendment o the United States Constitution, which
provides: "Excessive ball shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 61 The general
55. Patrick, The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective, 56 J. Cram. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Scr. 397, 398-404, 410 (1965).
56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force March 23, 1976,
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/63/6 (1967) art. 6(5).
57. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1983, at 5, col. 2.
58. See, e.g., P. STrRASto, VIOL.ENT DELINQUENTS (1978); TwErmT CENTUtRY FUND TASK
FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIM (1978);
Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 MINN. L. REv. 167 (1980); Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders
for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN.
L. REv. 515 (1978).
59. "Since the late 1960s, according to every available measure, the American public has
professed support for capital punishment by a majority of more than two to one." THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 65 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982); Washington Post, June 26, 1981, at A-19,
col. 1 (66% favor death penalty); TIME, June 1, 1981, at 13, col. 3 (63% favor death penalty).
60. In addition to the eighth amendment, of peripheral interest is that the twenty-sixth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution sets age eighteen as the dividing line for adult voting
rights. Also, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has never regarded age as a suspect
class under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.
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purposes of the cruel and unusual punishment clauses were set forth
by the Supreme Court in 1977:
First, it limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on
those convicted of crimes; second, it proscribes punishment grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime; and third, it imposes
substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as
such. We have recognized the last limitation as one to be applied
sparingly.61 [Citations omitted.]
The constitutionality of the death penalty seems to have been pre-
sumed by the United States Supreme Court for a century.62 Welcomed
by some3 and harshly criticized by others" is the Court's apparent
willingness in the past decade to reevaluate this premise of constitu-
tionality. In 1972 the Court held in Furman v. Georgia" that the death
penalty was unconstitutional as applied in those particular cases, but
it did not decide whether it is unconstitutional for all crimes and under
all circumstances. This lingering question was answered by the Court
in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia, 66in which a majority found that the death
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). See also Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979).
61. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).
62. The several concurring opinions acknowledge, as they must, that'until today
capital punishment was accepted and assumed as not unconstitutional per se under
the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. This is either the flat or
the implicit holding of a unanimous Court in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
134-135, in 1879; of a unanimous Court in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447,
in 1890; of the Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, in 1910; of all
those members of the Court, a majority, who addressed the issue in Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-464, 471-472, in 1947; of Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, speaking for himself and three others (Justices Black, Douglas,
and Whittaker) in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99, in 1958; in the denial of cer-
tiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, in 1963 (where, however, Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Goldberg would have heard argument with respect to the
imposition of the ultimate penalty on a convicted rapist who had "neither taken
nor endangered human life"); and of Mr. Justice Black in McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 226, decided only last Term on May 3, 1971.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 407-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Perhaps enough has been said to demonstrate the unswerving position that this
Court has taken in opinions spanning the last hundred years. On virtually every
occasion that any opinion has touched on the question of the constitutionality of
the death penalty, it has been asserted affirmatively, or tacitly assumed, that the
Constitution does not prohibit the penalty. No Justice of the court, until today,
has dissented from this consistent reading of the Constitution.
Id. at 428 (Powell, J., dissenting).
63. See H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTrrUTON, AND CAPITAL PuNisHmrNT 75-90 (1977).
64. See R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTns (1982).
65. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
66. 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion by Stewart); id. at 226 (White, J., concur-
ring). Accord, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S 262 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
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penalty does not per se violate the eighth amendment. In 197667 and
1977,68 the Court struck down statutes incorporating mandatory death
sentences, and the Court rejected the death penalty for rape cases in
1977.69 The next year in Lockett v. Ohio,70 the Court expressly re-
quired that all aspects of the offender's character and record be con-
sidered before imposing the death penalty. The meticulous treatment
given these cases stems from the Court's unarguable premise that "death
as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability."'
It seems well-established in the 1980s that the sentencing decision
must take into account the age of a particularly young offender: "[W]e
conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record.., that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."72 In Lockett the
Ohio death penalty statute was overruled partly because "consideration
of defendant's . . . age, would generally not be permitted, as such,
to affect the sentencing decision.""' The youth of the offender as an
appropriate mitigating factor was also mentioned in passing by the
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,74 Jurek v. Texas," Roberts v.
Louisiana,"" and Bell v. Ohio."'
The most recent Supreme Court consideration of this issue is Eddings
v. Oklahoma.78 The Court had granted certiorari79 on only one question:
67. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
68. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
69. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
70. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Accord, Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
71. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).
72. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 608.
74. "Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital
punishment (e.g., his youth .... )?" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion by Stewart).
75. "It [the jury] could further look to the age of the defendant .. " Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 273 (1976), quoting with approval Jurek v. Texas, 522 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1975).
76. But it is incorrect to suppose that no mitigating circumstances can exist when the
victim is a police officer. Circumstances such as the youth of the offender... [is
an example of a mitigating fact] which might attend the killing of a peace officer
and which [is] considered relevant in other jurisdictions.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636-37 (1977).
77. In Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978), the offender was a 16-year-old boy sentenced to
death for murder. At the sentencing hearing, Bell's attorney had argued that "Bell's minority
established mental deficiency as a matter of law; ... [Y]outh, the fact that he cooperated with
the police, and the lack of proof that he had participated in the actual killing strongly supported
an argument for a penalty less than death in this case." Id. at 641.
78. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
79. Id., cert. granted, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
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"Whether the infliction of the death penalty on a child who was sixteen
at the time of the crime constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States.""0 When the briefs were filed and the case argued before
the Court, however, the petitioner inserted an additional question for
the Court: "Whether the Court should address the plain error committed
by the trial court when it refused to consider relevant mitigating evidence
in violation of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). "Sl It was this
second, "'1lth-hour' claim"82 that garnered the five votes necessary
for reversing the imposition of the death penalty on Monty Lee Eddings
and remanding the case for sentencing consistent with Lockett."
Chief Justice Burger made passing reference to the original issue-
the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on children:
[O]ur only authority is to decide whether [sentences] are constitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment. The Court stops far short
of suggesting that there is any constitutional proscription against
imposition of the death penalty on a person who was under age
18 when the murder was committed .... Because the sentencing
proceedings in this case were in no sense inconsistent with Lockett
v. Ohio [citation omitted], I would decide the sole issue on which
we granted certiorari, and affirm the judgment.
Thus, four members of the Court (Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White) have indicated that they see no
constitutional bar to the imposition of the death penalty on a person
who committed murder when age sixteen.
The majority in Eddings left much more doubt as to where they
stand, simply restating that the "chronological age of a minor is itself
a relevant mitigating factor of great weight."85 In her separate
concurring opinion,86 Justice O'Connor succinctly stated her view of
the majority's holding: "I, however, do not read the Court's opinion
either as altering this Court's opinions establishing the constitutionality
of the death penalty or as deciding the issue of whether the Constitution
permits imposition of the death penalty on an individual who committed
a murder at age 16."1" The constitutional question is thus left in limbo.
Despite strong opposition,88 the Court seems poised on the brink of
80. Brief for Petitioner at i, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
81. Id.
82. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 120 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 117.
84. Id. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 116.
86. Id. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 119.
88. See, e.g., Gwin, The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual Punishment When Imposed Upon
Juveniles, 45 Ky. BENCH & BAR 16 (Apr. 1981).
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finding no constitutional prohibition to capital punishment for crimes
committed by minors.
After Furman v. Georgia, the response of the state legislatures can
be seen as "[t]he most marked indication of society's endorsement of
the death penalty for murder." 9 Even though the Model Penal Code9"
expressly rejects the death penalty for offenders under eighteen, a strong
majority of the states that have enacted new death penalty statutes
would permit it. Of the thirty-nine presumptively valid death penalty
statutes now in existence, only eight prohibit execution of offenders
whose crimes were committed while under age sixteen,9 ' seventeen,92
or eighteen.93 Nineteen other statutes have expressly designated the
offender's youth as a mitigating factor.94 The remainder do not specify
particular mitigating circumstances but do not rule out the youth of
the offender. The proposed federal statute would follow the majority
by expressly requiring that the age of the offender be considered as
a mitigating but not a prohibitive factor.9"
State appellate courts have necessarily faced this question with much
more frequency than have federal courts. No clear pattern can be derived
from these decisions; a substantial number of courts have come down
on both sides of the issue, some approving the death penalty for young
offenders,9 and others rejecting or strongly criticizing it. 97 Note,
89. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976).
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(I)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
91. NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.025 (1979).
92. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1982); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(a) (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f)(1) (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (Page 1982); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-234(a)(1) (Supp. 1982).
94. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1975); Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703G.5 (Supp. 1982); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(4) (Repl. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(g) (West Supp. 1982); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 532.025(2)(b)(8) (Supp. 1982); LA. CODE CRim. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(f) (Supp.
1982); MD. Caiu. LAW CODE ANN. § 413(g)(5) (RepI. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(g)
(Supp. 1982); Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.012(3X7) (Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(7)
(1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(d) (Reissue 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 II(b)(5)
(Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6 I (Rep]. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(7)
(Supp. 1981); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(4) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-20(C)(b)(7) (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(e) (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §
19.2-264.4(BXv) (Repl. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j)(vii) (Repl. 1983).
95. S. 114, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 5,162 (1981), § (f) (defendant youthful
at time of crime).
96. See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139, 602 P.2d 807, 809 (1979) (remanded for resentenc-
ing on other grounds); High v. State, 247 Ga. 289, 276 S.E.2d 5 (1981); State v. Prejean, 379
So. 2d 240 (La. 1979); State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979).
97. See, e.g., Bracewell v. State, 401 So. 2d 124, 125 (Ala. Cr. App. 1980): ("[W]e would
likewise direct the trial court to carefully reconsider the imposition of the death sentence where
two mitigating circumstances weigh heavily in the appellant's favor, i.e., her young age and the
dominance of the husband, her senior by several years."); Vasil v. State, 374 So. 2d 465 (Fla.
1979) (court reduced 15-year-old's death sentence), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967 (1980); Coleman
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:613
however, that the express language of Eddings,98 Lockett,99 and other
cases require that age be considered as a mitigating factor, at least
if the defendant proffers such evidence.
Criminological Purposes Served by Executing Children
From the foregoing discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that
capital punishment for children has been common enough during the
past 340 years to warrant attention. Even though the youthfulness of
offenders has probably always been considered, and now must be
specifically taken into account as a mitigating factor, the choice must
still be made between execution and a long term, usually life, in prison.
What factors unique to such cases should be considered?
A number of policies and presumptions underlie the continuing debate
over the appropriateness of capital punishment for crimes by adults.
Perhaps the most complete list has been provided by Justice Thurgood
Marshall: "There are six purposes conceivably served by capital
punishment: retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive criminal
acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and
economy."'00 Each should be considered in the context of crimes
committed by persons under age eighteen.
v. State, 378 So. 2d 640, 650 (Miss. 1979) (Court reduced the death sentence of a 16-year-old.
"Only after being fired upon did the 16-year-old shoot. Again, Coleman had the opportunity
to shoot [the victim's wife], who was an eyewitness, but did not."); State v. Stewart, 197 Neb.
497, 524-25, 250 N.W.2d 849, 865-66 (1977) (Court reduced death sentence of a 16-year-old.
"The issue is not whether his age 'excuses' the murder. Obviously it does not, and defendant
has been convicted of premeditated murder .... After weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in this case we conclude that the defendant's age at the time of the crime and
the absence of any significant criminal record mitigate strongly against the imposition of the
death penalty upon Rodney Stewart; and that the public will be served and justice done by sentenc-
ing him to a term of life imprisonment.").
98. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
99. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 608 (1976).
100. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). Amnesty Inter-
national summarizes the arguments as follows:
The retentionist argument is often based upon the following points:
1. For particularly reprehensible offences, death is the only fitting and adequate
punishment.
2. The death penalty acts as a deterrent.
3. Those who commit certain grave offences must be put to death for the pro-
tection of society at large.
Among the main arguments put forward by the abolitionists are:
1. The death penalty is irreversible. Decided upon according to fallible processes
of law by fallible human beings, it can be-and actually has been-inflicted
upon people innocent of any crime.
2. There is lack of convincing evidence that the death penalty has any more power
to deter than-say-a long period of imprisonment. Its deterrent effect on
rational offenders is highly questionable; it is even more so in the case of
offenders who are mentally-ill, or who are impelled by violent political motives.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss3/4
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The goal of societal retribution or legal vengeance achieved through
execution of a child seems difficult to justify. However, capital
punishment can be characterized as an understandable expression of
societal outrage at particular crimes. 0 ' In this sense, Justice Stewart
referred favorably to a retributive purpose in Gregg v. Georgia'0 2 and
in Furman v. Georgia.°3 Chief Justice Burger has also approved this
justification.'04 In contrast, Justice Marshall has argued persuasively
that the eighth amendment precludes retribution for its own sake.'5
Even if the execution of an adult solely for revenge is constitutionally
permissible, this justification of capital punishment is less appealing
when the object of righteous vengeance is a child. The spectacle of
our society seeking legal vengeance through execution of a child raises
fundamental questions about the nature of children's moral responsi-
bility for their actions and about society's moral responsibility to pro-
tect and nurture children.
Probably the most complex issue is whether capital punishment is
more effective than life imprisonment as a deterrent to crime. This
key issue has been the subject of extensive research,'0 6 but no consistent
3. Execution by whatever means and for whatever offence is a cruel, inhuman
and degrading punishment.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Tn DEATH PENALTY: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 3 (1979).
101. See H. PACKER, THE Ln ms OF THE CRIMAL SANCTION 43-44 (1968).
102. "This function [retribution] may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered
society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their
wrongs." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
103. On that score I would say only that I cannot agree that retribution is a constitu-
tionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment. The instinct for
retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the
administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment
they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante
justice, and lynch law.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
104. It is argued that retribution can be discounted because that, after all, is what the
Eighth Amendment seeks to eliminate. There is no authority suggesting that the
Eighth Amendment was intended to purge the law of its retributive elements, and
the Court has consistently assumed that retribution is a legitimate dimension of
the punishment of crimes.... It would be reading a great deal into the Eighth
Amendment to hold that the punishments authorized by legislatures cannot
constitutionally reflect a retributive purpose.
Id. at 394-95 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 342-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
106. See, e.g., T. SELLIN, CAPITAL PUNIsHMENT (1967); Bailey, A Multivariate Cross-Sectional
Analysis of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 64 Soc'Y & SOCIAL RESEARCH 183 (1980);
Bailey, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty for Murder in California, 52 S. CAL. L. REv.
743 (1979); Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich
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conclusions have been drawn by members of the Supreme Court."0 7
When applied to children, the key issues are adolescents' perception
of death and whether that perception acts as a more significant deterrent
to criminal acts than life imprisonment.
Even less is known about death as a deterrent for adolescents than
is known about death as a deterrent for adults. Many social scientists
would agree that adolescents live for today with little thought of the
future consequences of their actions. 08 The defiant attitudes and risk-
taking behaviors of some adolescents are probably related to their
"developmental stage of defiance about danger and death.'"' 9 Some
on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bedau, Deterrence
and the Death Penalty: A Reconsideration, 61 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 539
(1970); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punish-
ment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Ques-
tion of Life and Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 397 (1975); Glaser, Capital Punishment-Deterrent
or Stimulus to Murder? Our Unexamined Deaths and Penalties, 10 U. ToL. L. REv. 317 (1979);
Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1976).
107. Compare the view of Justice Stewart:
Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function
as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing em-
pirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view. We may nevertheless assume
safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the
threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death
penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated
murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of death may well
enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976) with that of Justice Brennan:
In short, whatever the speculative validity of the assumption that the threat of
death is a superior deterrent, there is no reason to believe that as currently ad-
ministered the punishment of death is necessary to deter the commission of capital
crimes. Whatever might be the case were all or substantially all eligible criminals
quickly put to death, unverifiable possibilities are an insufficient basis upon which
to conclude that the threat of death today has any greater deterrent efficacy than
the threat of imprisonment.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 302 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring), and with Justice Mar-
shall's perspective:
Despite the fact that abolitionists have not proved nondeterrence beyond a
reasonable doubt, they have succeeded in showing by clear and convincing evidence
that capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society.
That is all that they must do. We would shirk our judicial responsibilities if we
failed to accept the presently existing statistics and demanded more proof. It may
be that we now possess all the proof that anyone could ever hope to assemble
on the subject....
In light of the massive amount of evidence before us, I see no alternative but
to conclude that capital punishment cannot be justified on the basis of its deterrent
effect.
Id. at 353-54 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
108. Kastenbaum, Time and Death in Adolescence, in THE MEANING OF DEATH 99 (H. Feifel
ed. 1959).
109. Fredlund, Children and Death from the School Setting Viewpoint, 47 J. SCHOOL HEALTH
533 (1977).
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adolescents may play games of chance with death from a feeling of
omnipotence." ,0 They typically have not learned to accept the finality
of death."' Adolescents tend to view death as a remote possibility;
old people die, not teenagers. Consider, for example, teenagers'
propensity to flirt with death through reckless driving, ingestion of
dangerous drugs, and other similar "death-defying" behavior.
The meager research on this issue suggests the conclusion that
threatening a child with death probably does not have the same impact
as threatening an adult with death. Even if some percentage of adults
are deterred by the death penalty, the deterrent effect tends to lose
much of its power when imposed upon an adolescent.
No one can deny that execution of a child will prevent repetitive
criminal acts by that particular child. The death penalty does, however,
seem an unnecessarily harsh solution to the problem of recidivism. Not
only are murderers "extremely unlikely to commit other crimes either
in prison or upon their release,"" but irreversibly abandoning all hope
of the reform of a child is squarely in opposition to the fundamental
premises of juvenile justice and comparable socio-legal systems. While
the specific deterrence argument may be somewhat persuasive in the
case of the 45-year-old habitual criminal, it is singularly inappropriate
and defeatist when applied to the 16-year-old child.
Using capital punishment as leverage to encourage guilty pleas and
confessions seems not only a questionable justification for this ultimate
sanction but also unnecessary in a child's case. The threat of life
imprisonment for an adolescent who has fifty to sixty years yet to live
is so overwhelming that it should provide whatever leverage the
government might need.
The potential fifty to sixty years of life in prison also gives rise to
an economic argument-that it is simply an enormous and unjustifiable
financial burden on society to support life imprisonment instead of
executing youthful offenders. Given the extraordinarily high cost of
capital trials and appeals, as well as the cost of maintaining death row
and of performing executions, it would seem reasonable to conclude
that "there can be no doubt that it costs more to execute a man than
to keep him in prison for life."" ' 3
Finally, the issue of using capital punishment for eugenic purposes
or to improve the human race seems unworthy of serious considera-
110. Miller, Adolescent Suicide: Etiology and Treatment, in 9 ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 327
(S. Feinstein, J. Looney, A. Schwartzberg, & A. Sorosky eds. 1981).
111. R. LoNTrro, CHILDREN'S CONCEPTIONS OF DEATH 134-41 (1980); Hostler, The Develop-
ment of the Child's Concept of Death, in THE CHILD AND DEAT (0. Sahler ed. 1978).
112. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 355 (1972) (Marshall J., concurring).
113. Id. at 358.
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tion."4 In any event, the less severe alternatives of sterilization and/or
life imprisonment would seem to be required by the Constitution.",
This brief consideration of the purposes served by capital punishment
for children is inconclusive at best, as is such a consideration vis-a-vis
adults. Most of the justifications for capital punishment of adults lose
whatever persuasiveness they have when applied to the case of an
offender under age eighteen.
Conclusion
The 287 executions for crimes committed by persons under age
eighteen comprise only 2% of the total of 14,029 executions in our
history. The concept of capital punishment for children seems surprising
in a country that so dotes upon its children. If early reforms of the
criminal justice system were intended to benefit children by minimizing
the harshness of criminal sentences, why is it that capital punishment
of children was allowed to continue? How can the 192 executions of
children since the inception of the socio-legal experiment in juvenile
justice be explained?
If the phenomenon ended there, perhaps the execution of children
would be cast aside as just another odd chapter in American history.
But the reemergence of capital punishment in the past few years,
complete with placing children on death row, makes it clear that this
issue is of current as well as historical importance.
Few state capital punishment statutes prohibit executions of children,
and the Supreme Court has come perilously close to removing any
supposed constitutional barriers. The present state of the law is that
the youth of the offender must be considered as a mitigating factor
by the sentencing authority. That and other mitigating factors can be
overcome by aggravating factors, though, resulting in capital punishment
for a child even in the 1980s.
114. [T]his Nation has never formally professed eugenic goals, and the history of the
world does not look kindly on them. If eugenics is one of our purposes, then
the legislatures should say so forthrightly and design procedures to serve this goal.
Until such time, I can only conclude, as has virtually everyone else who has looked
at the problem, that capital punishment cannot be defended on the basis of any
eugenic purposes.
Id. at 357.
115. For example, even Chief Justice Burger has recognized that sentencing procedures should
not create "the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call
for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable
and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). Whether sterilization would be a constitutionally acceptable
"less severe penalty" is in doubt. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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The notion of a governmental agency imposing the death penalty
upon a child through its judicial system raises the deepest questions
about the demands of justice versus the special nature of childhood.
A handful of states have formed a minority position that rejects capital
punishment for children. Other jurisdictions will be considering new
capital punishment statutes or amendments to present capital punishment
statutes, and they should give strong consideration to this minority
position. As the Supreme Court continues to review challenges to the
constitutionality of capital punishment, the issue of the age of the
offender should be given special consideration. Even if the eighth
amendment does not inherently proscribe death as a punishment for
particularly aggravated murder by mature adults, the unique legal,
psychological, and social status of persons under age eighteen should
be incorporated into this area of constitutional interpretation. The
response to this article's opening question should be that the United
States counts itself among "civilized societies [which] will not tolerate
the spectacle of execution of children."
'" 6
116. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6, commentary at 133 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980).
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